Retail Dive's reporter's notebook published on 13 October describes a sporting goods store where a 65-foot ferris wheel spins above a fully stocked aquarium, and where a toy shop, bowling lanes and an arcade share the upper floor. Scheels, founded in 1902 as a general merchandise store, started selling athletic gear in 1972 and is now described by BCE Consulting senior adviser Matt Powell as "the best kept secret in retail". The lesson for omnichannel operators is uncomfortable but simple: the store trip itself is the merchandising unit, and footfall is manufactured long before the checkout lane.
Key Conclusions
The first conclusion is that assortment breadth has become a footfall strategy rather than a merchandising accident. A retailer that carries sporting goods, toys, arcade entertainment and a food operation under one roof is not chasing category efficiency; it is deliberately widening the number of reasons a household has to make the trip. In a market where delivery is fast and cheap, the scarce resource is no longer product availability but a credible reason to leave the house.
The second conclusion concerns measurement. Most store networks still evaluate a location on sales per square foot and conversion rate, both of which describe what happened after the customer arrived. Scheels-style formats require operators to measure the reasons for arrival as well: dwell time by zone, cross-category basket attachment, and the share of visits that include a non-purchase activity. Without those inputs, a store that manufactures footfall looks identical in the reporting pack to one that merely benefits from its location.
Inside The Aisle: What The Format Actually Looks Like
A retail trip built from multiple destinations
The format stacks several independent destinations into a single visit. Retail Dive's account opens on an aquarium and moves past a ferris wheel toward a toy shop, bowling lanes and an arcade, with the sporting goods assortment threaded through the same floorplate. Each of those elements can justify a trip on its own, which is precisely why the combination changes trip frequency rather than simply increasing the size of a single basket. For operators, the practical implication is that store design decisions must be evaluated as a portfolio of destinations instead of a linear sequence of categories.
Employee ownership and the limits of the model
Scheels is privately held and employee owned, and it declined a media interview for the piece on the grounds that it generally keeps business details private. That posture matters because the format depends on long-horizon capital decisions that public companies often struggle to defend to quarterly audiences. A ferris wheel inside a store is not a campaign; it is a fixed asset with a depreciation schedule, and it only pays back if the operator is willing to hold the format long enough for trip frequency to compound.
Best Practices
Turning a destination store into an operating system
The first practice is to fund the destination elements as merchandising infrastructure rather than marketing spend, with clear ownership, maintenance budgets and replacement cycles. The second is to instrument the visit. Zone-level dwell time, cross-category attachment and repeat visit frequency should be captured continuously, because those are the metrics that distinguish a destination store from a well-located one. The third practice is to align labour scheduling with the activity mix, since entertainment zones and food operations create peaks that a purely merchandising schedule will not anticipate.
A fourth practice is to keep the digital layer honest about what the store does. If the online experience cannot show which activities are available at a given location, or which services require a booking, the store's footfall advantage is invisible to the customers who plan their trips on a phone. Publishing live store-level attributes, from service availability to event schedules, is a comparatively cheap way to convert digital intent into a physical visit. Retailers that skip this step often find that their most differentiated locations are also their least discoverable ones.
Finally, operators should be explicit about the trade-offs the format imposes. Destination stores consume more capital per square foot, carry higher operating complexity and demand broader category management skills than a conventional assortment. The format works when the incremental trip frequency it generates is durable; it fails when the novelty decays faster than the depreciation schedule, which is why the metrics chosen in the first year tend to determine whether the format survives its third.
Common Mistakes
The most common mistake is to copy the visible elements without copying the economics. Adding an arcade or a food counter without funding maintenance, staffing and replacement cycles produces a novelty that decays within two seasons and then becomes a cost line. A second mistake is to measure the format with conventional store metrics and conclude it underperforms, because sales per square foot is diluted by non-selling space by design. A third mistake is to treat the destination store as a flagship exception rather than an operating model, which prevents the learning from being transferred to the rest of the network. A fourth is to ignore labour scheduling, where entertainment and food peaks can quietly destroy the margin the format was meant to create.
Footfall Physics: Reading The Store As A Data Asset
Which signals are worth instrumenting
A destination store generates a richer signal set than a conventional one, and the useful subset is smaller than most vendors suggest. Zone-level dwell time shows which destinations actually hold attention. Cross-category attachment rates show whether the format is creating a combined basket or simply hosting separate visits. Non-purchase visit share quantifies how much of the footfall is entertainment-led and how much is shopping-led, which in turn determines whether the format should be expanded or rebalanced. Repeat visit frequency over a rolling eight-week window is the closest available proxy for durability.
Those signals also connect the store to the wider demand picture. Retail Dive reported on 14 October that Moody's upgraded its retail and apparel outlook as tariff relief improved margin visibility, and on 15 October that Lululemon restructured its raw materials team and cut seven roles as it reshaped supply-side capability. Both items point in the same direction: cost and capability decisions are being taken at the supply end while demand-side differentiation increasingly happens at the store. Reading footfall signals alongside those supply-side moves is what turns store data into a planning input rather than a report.
Summary
Scheels is useful precisely because it is unfashionable: a 1902 general merchandise business that ended up selling experiences as much as products. For omnichannel operators, the transferable lesson is not the ferris wheel but the discipline behind it, which treats the trip as the unit of design and instruments the reasons customers show up. Stores that manufacture footfall need a measurement system built for that job, and the retailers that build one early will be the ones able to defend physical space as the cost of delivery keeps falling.
The next twelve months will test that logic under pressure. Holiday demand is being planned against a softer consumer backdrop, supply-side restructuring is continuing, and the capital available for experiential formats will be scrutinised more closely than in the previous cycle. The formats that survive will be the ones whose footfall signals were captured well enough to prove the trip frequency claim, rather than the ones that simply looked the most distinctive in a press release.
Data Sources
- Retail Dive: Reporter's notebook inside Scheels, published 13 October 2026 — Retail Dive
- Retail Dive: Lululemon restructures raw materials team, published 15 October 2026 — Retail Dive
- Retail Dive: Moody's upgrades retail and apparel outlook, published 14 October 2026 — Retail Dive
- NRF: published holiday and seasonal forecasts — NRF
- Coresight Research: US holiday retail outlook and e-commerce benchmarks — Coresight Research
- Deloitte: holiday retail survey on spending intent and channel preference — Deloitte
FAQ
Why does a destination store need different metrics?
A: Because non-selling space dilutes sales per square foot by design, so conventional metrics systematically understate the format's contribution to trip frequency.
What should be instrumented first?
A: Zone-level dwell time and cross-category attachment, because together they show whether the format is creating a combined basket or hosting separate visits.
How long before the format can be judged?
A: A rolling eight-week repeat visit window is the practical minimum, since novelty effects can mask real trip frequency for the first two seasons.
Is the format only viable for privately held retailers?
A: No, but it is easier to sustain when capital decisions do not have to be defended quarterly. Public operators typically need a clearer payback narrative.
What is the biggest hidden cost?
A: Labour scheduling. Entertainment and food peaks create demand patterns that a conventional merchandising rota will not anticipate.
References
- Retail Dive — https://www.retaildive.com/news/scheels-store-experience-retail-best-kept-secret/831211/
- Retail Dive — https://www.retaildive.com/news/lululemon-restructures-raw-materials-team-layoffs/833106/
- Retail Dive — https://www.retaildive.com/news/moodys-retail-apparel-outlook-boosted-tariff-refunds/832964/
- NRF — https://nrf.com/research-insights/forecasts
- Coresight Research — https://coresight.com/us-holiday-retail/
- Deloitte — https://www.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/industry/retail-distribution/holiday-retail-sales-consumer-survey.html
