As of 30 October 2026, Pop Mart has told investors that third quarter revenue fell 45 to 50 per cent year on year, with every region going backwards, and that sales in the Americas dropped 70 to 75 per cent while mainland China slipped 25 to 30 per centInside Retail Australia: Can Pop Mart sustain growth as the Labubu craze fades?. The product story behind the number is more interesting than the decline itself, because a 45 per cent fall on a base that grew 245 per cent is not a collapse, it is a return to a smaller but still larger market.
A base that could not repeat
The comparison base is the whole story. Third quarter of 2025 was the biggest in the company's history, driven by Labubu plush bag charms moving from collector shelves onto handbags worldwide. Revenue that quarter rose 245 to 250 per cent, and overseas sales rose 365 to 370 per cent. No product line sustains that against itself a year later.
Chief operating officer Si De named the comparison as the main reason for the decline. The arithmetic supports him. If third quarter revenue roughly tripled in 2025 and has now halved, the business is still selling around 70 to 90 per cent more than in the same quarter of 2024, and mainland China revenue is roughly double its 2024 level. What ended was a spike, not a category.
Regional split shows where the trade cooled
The regional numbers describe a very different shape of correction. The Americas fell 70 to 75 per cent, Asia-Pacific outside mainland China fell 65 to 70 per cent, Europe and other markets declined 50 to 55 per cent, and mainland China slipped 25 to 30 per cent. The markets that ran hottest on the plush charm trade corrected hardest, which is exactly what a demand spike looks like when it unwinds.
Mainland China, described as the steadiest part of the business, fell least. That is a useful signal for anyone reading the collectibles category. A market with an established collector base and a dense offline store network absorbs a fashion correction better than a market built on a single viral product. The difference is not demand, it is infrastructure.
| Region | Q3 revenue change | What it suggests |
|---|---|---|
| Americas | Down 70 to 75 per cent | Spike-driven demand, thin collector base |
| Asia-Pacific ex China | Down 65 to 70 per cent | Resale market normalised fastest |
| Europe and others | Down 50 to 55 per cent | Smaller base, milder swing |
| Mainland China | Down 25 to 30 per cent | Dense offline network absorbs shock |
What a 45 per cent drop actually leaves
Analysts had braced for a fall, just not this steep: JPMorgan had pencilled in about 37 per cent. Shares dropped as much as 6 per cent to HK$123.80, an 18-month low, and the stock has lost more than 30 per cent this year. Market reaction of that size is about expectations, not about the underlying business, which is still larger than it was two years ago.
The harder question is what the remaining demand looks like. A collector base buys on release cycles and cares about series continuity; a fashion base buys one viral item and leaves. If the remaining revenue is mostly collectors, the business is smaller but more predictable. If it is mostly leftover fashion demand, the next two quarters will be worse than this one.
Reading category growth after the peak
Category growth in collectibles is not a smooth curve, it is a series of spikes around releases. Reading a single quarter as a trend is how brands over-expand and then over-correct. The useful measure is the two-year comparison, which strips out the spike and shows whether the category has actually grown.
On that measure the category looks intact. What changed is who is selling into it. When resale prices on a viral product normalise, the marginal seller, usually a reseller rather than a collector, exits. That exit shows up as a demand collapse in the data even though the underlying collector market is unchanged. Distinguishing the two requires product-level resale data, not just revenue.
Watch channel inventory before reading demand
A sharp revenue fall can come from genuine demand loss or from distributors destocking. These have opposite implications for the next quarter. If inventory sits with distributors, orders resume once it clears; if it sits with the brand, discounting follows. Brands rarely disclose the split, which is why resale price is the more reliable early signal.
Judge new product by sell-through, not by launch noise
Launch-day sell-outs are a poor measure in a category with limited initial stock. Sell-through at 30 and 60 days, and the resale premium after the first month, tell you whether a release has genuine collector demand or borrowed attention from the previous hit. Reporting launch results without those two figures flatters every release.
What operators should do next
The sequence is to separate reseller demand from collector demand using resale data, then set release cadence against the collector base rather than the peak, then decide store expansion on two-year comparisons. Building stores against a spike is the most expensive mistake in this category, because leases outlast fashions.
Pop Mart still has a global store network, a recognised character portfolio and a base that is roughly double its 2024 level in its home market. The next year will show whether that base buys product or buys hype, and the answer will be visible in sell-through long before it appears in quarterly revenue.
FAQ
Does a 45 per cent decline mean the category is over?
No. Against a base that grew 245 per cent, the business is still well above its 2024 level. What ended was a demand spike driven by one viral product, not the collector category itself.
Why did the Americas fall hardest?
Because that market was built fastest on spike demand and has the thinnest established collector base. Markets with dense offline networks and long-standing collector communities absorb a fashion correction better.
How can a brand tell reseller demand from collector demand?
Resale price is the cleanest early signal. When the resale premium collapses, marginal resellers exit and revenue falls even if collector demand is stable. Product-level resale data separates the two.
Should store expansion pause after a quarter like this?
Expansion should be judged on two-year comparisons, not on the most recent peak. Building stores against a spike is expensive because leases outlast fashions.
